From: Josh Cullinan
Sent: Tuesday, 5 May 2020 11:59 AM
To: chambers.ross.j@fwc.gov.au
Cc: Michael Cornthwaite <mcornthwaite@raffwu.org.au>
Subject: AM2020/20 Fast Food Industry Award - Submission

Dear Associate to President Ross

Please find attached submission of RAFFWU in the matter AM2020/20 for filing in accordance with the directions in the statement dated 3 May 2020.

We enclose:

- a Word Version of the submission;
- Annexure A as its own document; and
- a PDF version of the submission including Annexure A.

We confirm contact details for the hearing at 2pm AEST for RAFFWU are:

- Josh Cullinan, Secretary, 0416 241 763
- Michael Cornthwaite, National Industrial Officer, 0478 747 553

Kind regards

Josh Cullinan
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IN THE FAIR WORK COMMISSION

AM2020/20

IN THE MATTER OF:

APPLICATION TO VARY THE FAST FOOD INDUSTRY AWARD 2020

AIG (APPLICANT)

SUBMISSION OF
RETAIL AND FAST FOOD WORKERS UNION (RAFFWU)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Retail and Fast Food Workers Union Incorporated ("**RAFFWU**") opposes the application to vary the Award.

2. We submit the expedited trial of these matters prejudices those in opposition and carries the very real likelihood the opposing voice of very many workers (and their representatives) may not be heard. While RAFFWU has prepared this submission with much less time available to the union than was available to the applicant in preparing its application, we do not wish for this submission to be used as a basis for satisfaction that an expedited trial is appropriate. Further that there is a worker view attached to this submission we again do not want to suggest workers were able to have their voice heard in this expedited process.

3. We note the applicant has not identified when it commenced consideration of its application, when it first discussed the potential application with the consenters and why it did not raise the application with RAFFWU – a known representative[1] of workers (and maligned contradictor) in the sector.

4. The application for all intents and purposes is an ambush on the very many workers in the fast food industry who rely on the Modern Award and the Fair Work Act to regulate their employment. One voice of a worker is annexed to this

[1] For example, see [2018] FWCFB 2797

submission at Annexure A. Mr Farrell is a McDonald's employee at the Albion outlet.

Application

5. The application seeks to implement a scheme different to the scheme considered in other COVID-19 Modern Award application.

6. We note the statement at [14] reiterates the purpose of the variation is to give *employers* flexibilities to *moderate the impacts* of the Pandemic.

7. The application includes no evidence. The assertions submitted with the application are without any clear foundation. There is a mere single assertion at [7] of the application Attachment B, reiterated at [8], that there is a dramatic decline in demand from customers.

8. No information is provided of the actual purported decline and how it manifests across various types of stores. No proposal exists for there to be certain threshold requirements for employers to access their proposed 'flexibilities' which are entirely in the favour of employers.

9. The only employer referred to by the applicant is McDonald's.

10. We note [21] is liable to mislead the reader. There are only two relevant Award covered employers that are unlikely to be subject to the 30% eligibility criteria for Job Keeper. They are the corporate entities of McDonald's Australia Limited and Domino's Pizza Enterprises Limited. Those entities operate approximately 10% of outlets under their relevant banner. They may have the 50% test applied to them by virtue of their substantial corporate income derived from franchise and related fees.

11. The applicant ought have been clear of the group who don't meet that eligibility. It is important information because those two entities are multi-billion dollar behemoths more than capable of managing their affairs without the 'flexibilities' the applicant and its consenters seek to foist upon low paid workers.

12. The Federal Government in its statement[2] on Job Keeper said:

> *However, larger businesses need to have a greater decline in turnover than smaller businesses to satisfy the basic decline in turnover test.* ***This recognises the greater capacity of larger businesses to withstand the economic impacts of the Coronavirus.***

13. Other entities have the lower 30% threshold applied to them. The applicant should make plain what proportion of the employers it represents have applied for Job Keeper.

14. This is important information because an employing entity which has not experienced a decline of 30% in revenue – the benchmark set by the Federal Government – would be entitled to the proposed 'flexibilities'. This raises a question as to whether such an arrangement is required at all for such an entity.

15. That is, there is no "regulatory gap" for very many of the employers. For many employers, the "gap" is that they don't have the suite of tools to exploit workers which they would like to have. There is no evidence of the financial exigency of any employer, let alone a vast number, who require the purported intervention proposed by the applicant and its consenters.

16. This is particularly so with employers – such as McDonald's – in which some 75% of employees are engaged on a casual basis. RAFFWU also understands the turnover among casual employees at McDonald's is very high. With such high casual employment the applicant's purported essential need for 'flexibility' for part-time and full-time employees to moderate the impact of the pandemic is simply unsustainable.

17. The application relies on the brief note[3] prepared by Professor Borland in March 2020. That note is not replicated in the application but it is heavily relied on by

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[2] EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, Issued by authority of the Treasurer, *Coronavirus Economic Response Package (Payments and Benefits) Act 2020* and *Coronavirus Economic Response Package (Payments and Benefits) Rules 2020*

[3] Benefit from greater flexibility in employment arrangements, Professor Jeff Borland, March 2020, accessed 4 May 2020 at https://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/documents/awardmod/variations/2020/am202012-information-note-flex-010420.pdf

the applicant. It is important to analyse what flexibility Professor Borland was referring to in the report.

> *What is meant by 'benefit from allowing extra flexibility?' In this report the term 'allowing extra flexibility in employment arrangements' is taken to mean that it may be possible to modify award provisions in order to make it easier for a worker's hours of work to be varied – for example, from full-time to part-time. Allowing extra flexibility in this way could mean that* ***extra employees are able to be retained in employment*** *in response to a decrease in labour demand. For example, a business which used to hire three workers for 40 hours per week, and which during the pandemic only requires 40 hours of labour in total, might then be able to retain each of the Benefit from greater flexibility in employment arrangements 3 three workers for 13 ⅓ hours per week, rather than needing to lay off two workers and retaining one worker in a full-time position. Retaining extra employees in employment has potential benefits for both the employee and an employer. Employees who are laid off experience a variety of costs that do not occur (or are smaller than) when they are retained at reduced hours – including loss of income; loss of firm-specific human capital and skill atrophy; negative psychological effects; and the need to undertake search activity to find a new job. Similarly, employers who layoff a worker and subsequently need to hire a new worker to fill the vacancy created when demand conditions improve will experience costs that do not occur when they can retain employees at reduced hours – including loss of the value of firm-specific human capital accumulated by the worker; and costs of searching for new worker and retraining. The potential benefits of retaining employees during episodes such as the current pandemic seems to represent are especially large. Many firms are experiencing a substantial decrease in their demand for labour, but as the pandemic is controlled are likely to have the same level of labour demand as before the pandemic. That reversal of the effect on labour demand, together with what will hopefully be a shorter duration than an average downturn, makes it more valuable for firms to retain an already trained worker and to not have to search for a new worker.*
>
> **Emphasis added**

18. This application does not introduce flexibilities as described by Professor Borland. Far from it. There is no material, evidence or anecdote identifying how casualising part-time work will ensure *extra employees are able to be retained in employment*. In fact, the de-securitising and casualising of work will mean employees lose their employment.

19. No evidence is presented of particular or specific decreases in labour demand. No evidence is presented as to how any such decrease manifests in a need to implement arrangements proposed in the application.

20. The changes do not meet the stresses of COVID-19. There is nothing about these changes which preserves jobs. The cost of the application of these changes is just a cost on employees.

21. In essence, the applicant and its consenters are proposing a scheme which they say would retain workers in employment by paying those workers less than they would otherwise earn. That is not a "flexibility" which should be entertained by the Fair Work Commission.

Scope of Application - Scheme Targets the Vulnerable

22. The scheme proposed by the applicant and its consenters is structured in a way that targets the most vulnerable. This includes new employees and employees who are not new but are employed on a visa class which makes them ineligible for Job Keeper.

23. The scheme would provide the opportunity for an employer that remains open to require such visa workers to take annual leave and agree to casualise their employment in order to access additional work.

24. For those employers who do not meet the thresholds for decline in revenue, the scheme targets all workers who we note are often:

(a) Very low paid;
(b) Young; and
(c) Often from ethnically diverse backgrounds.

25. We now consider each specific proposal.

Part-Time Employment

26. The Award provides specific arrangements for part-time work including:

> **12.2** At the time of first being employed, the employer and the part-time

employee will agree, in writing, on a regular pattern of work, specifying at least:

- the number of hours worked each day;
- which days of the week the employee will work;
- the actual starting and finishing times of each day;
- that any variation will be in writing, including by any electronic means of communication (for example, by text message);
- that the daily engagement is a minimum of 3 consecutive hours; and
- the times of taking and the duration of meal breaks.

27. The proposed arrangement for part-time workers is very similar (if not identical) to the proposed and rejected[4] Award variation of the Australian Industry Group.

28. That application by the Australian Industry Group was for a variation to the Fast Food Industry Award to include a term without the benefits of clause 12.2 of the Award. In rejecting the application, the Fair Work Commission ([2019] FWCFB 272) stated:

> ***[135]*** *Ai Group contends that its application is based on 'industrial merit' and includes:*
>
> > *'the adoption of a standard clause that encompasses adequate protections for employees but retains flexibility for employers, as well as the encouragement of part time employment in circumstances where casuals are often used to work additional hours'*
>
> ***[136]*** *Given the basis of its application, that is, industrial merit, Ai Group submits that there is no (or a limited) need for evidence in support of its application, in particular:*
>
> > *'There is no need for employers or franchisors to consult widely with employees or franchisees as part of gathering evidence in support of its application'.*
>
> ***[137]*** *We propose to make* ***two general observations about the 'industrial merit' and fairness*** *of the proposed claim.*
>
> ***[138]*** *First, if granted the claim would permit an employer to roster part time employees within the range of the 'employee's agreed availability'. If the variation were granted* ***it would effectively mean that a part time employee would have to be available to work at any time within the range of their stated availability and that the times they could be required to work may change from week to week.***

[4] See [2019] FWCFB 272

[139] *An example serves to illustrate the breadth of the proposed clause. Say the agreed guaranteed minimum hours are 9 hours per week and the employee's agreed availability is between 9am and 3pm Monday, Wednesday and Friday. Under the proposed clause an employee may be rostered to work their guaranteed minimum hours in any one of a number of figurations, including:*

- *9am to 12 noon Monday, Wednesday and Friday;*
- *9am to 3pm Monday and 12 noon to 3pm Friday;*
- *12 noon to 3pm Monday, Wednesday and Friday.*

[140] *Further, the employees' roster may change from week to week.*

[141] *This aspect of the proposed clause* ***is very different to the existing part time employment clause in the Fast Food Award*** *(clause 12, see [93] above). The existing clause mandates that the employer and the part time employee agree on 'a regular pattern of work' which specifies:*

- *the number of hours worked each day;*
- *which days of the week the employee will work;*
- *the actual starting and finishing times of each day;*
- *that any variation will be in writing;*
- *that the minimum daily engagement is three hours; and*
- *the times of taking and the duration of meal breaks.*

[142] *Any change to the agreed 'regular pattern of work' must be by agreement, in writing, before the change occurs.*

[143] *The* ***existing part time clause*** *is consistent with the general principle stated by the AIRC Full Bench in the Award Modernisation Decision of 4 September 2009, in that is* ***provides part time employees with a 'degree of regularity and certainty'.*** *It seems to us that the* ***proposed flexible part time clause provides little certainty as to when guaranteed minimum hours will be worked****. Indeed the proposed clause* ***may facilitate working arrangements which are more akin to casual employment rather than part time employment, albeit without the requirement to pay a casual loading.***

[144] *It is no answer to this criticism to suggest that the employee exercises control over their working arrangements by specifying their availability.* ***We do not doubt that as a practical matter, employees would feel some pressure to maximise their stated availability in order to obtain employment****. Further, the capacity for an employee to alter their 'agreed availability'* ***is significantly constrained*** *by the proposed clause, which is the second general observation which we wish to make.*

[145] *Proposed clause 12.6* ***places a significant constraint on an employee's capacity to alter*** *the days and hours of their 'agreed availability', in particular:*

- *there must have been a 'genuine and ongoing change to the employee's personal circumstances';* and

- *the employee must give the employer 14 days' written notice.*

> ***[146]*** ***<u>Nor is there any obligation upon the employer</u>*** *to accept a proposed alteration – if it cannot 'reasonably be accommodated by the employer' then the employer and employee need to reach a new agreement concerning guaranteed minimum hours.*
>
> ***[147]*** *The constraints imposed by proposed clause 12.6 are particularly problematic in view of the evidence in these proceedings. That evidence supports a finding that employees in the Major Fast Food Chains change their availabilities regularly, including on a permanent or ongoing basis and a temporary basis. The reasons for permanent or ongoing changes include changes in school or university timetabling and commitments as well as sporting commitments. The reasons for temporary changes include studying for school or university examinations, taking school and university holidays and attending family or social commitments.*
>
> ***[148]*** ***<u>In our view the proposed variation lacks merit. If the award was varied in the manner proposed by Ai Group it would not provide 'a fair and relevant minimum safety net of terms and conditions'</u>****; it would not achieve the modern awards objective. In reaching this conclusion we have taken into account the s 134 considerations, insofar as they are relevant to the claim. We reject the claim for those reasons.*
>
> Emphasis Added

29. The pandemic is obviously a change in circumstances however nothing before the Fair Work Commission could be construed as necessitating a change from the decision in 2019.

30. The proposed schedule recognises the H.7 proposed form of employment is, in fact, casual employment where it acknowledges reversion to casual employment at H.7.8 unless agreed otherwise when the schedule ceases.

31. In truth, the structure is ***akin to casual employment, albeit without the requirement to pay a casual loading***.

32. There is no careful construction or deliberately thought out plan proposed by the applicant and its consenters. This is merely the reagitation of its failed application which was specifically rejected, for good reason, in 2019.

33. It would put in place a more complex structure. It is not an emergency, more simple, structure. The offering of additional hours to respond to emergent needs is a furphy and, similar to the entire application, not backed by any evidence.

There are very many casual workers throughout the sector ready and able to work in safe work environments.

34. The proposal is expressly stated to avoid overtime rates. However, the true rationale is to avoid the casual loading properly recognised by the Full Bench in 2019.

35. There is no "regulatory gap". The Job Keeper structures do not permit the proposed form of casualised employment. Job Keeper arrangements are in place for an employer to seek agreement from their employee for changes to their hours of work but those changes must go through a consultative process, and require agreement. A failure to agree to the change in hours for a shift, week or roster cycle would mean the hours are not worked while the matter is arbitrated by the Fair Work Commission.

36. In return for these changes, the Federal Government acknowledged employees require a reward for this flexibility. We submit the vast majority of part-time employees in the Fast Food industry earn less than $1500 per fortnight. In practice, the Federal Government rewards these flexibilities with a guaranteed $1500 per fortnight payment.

37. The applicant and its consenters want to impose a far worse structure through its application without any of the reward.

38. Job Keeper does not permit an employer to engage a part-time employee in a form of employment akin to casual employment albeit without the casual loading. The true motivations and expectations of employers for the application can only be tested through proper filing and examination of evidence.

Annual Leave

39. The annual leave scheme is misguided. Today, workers and their employer can agree on the use of annual leave. Not a shred of evidence is provided that there is any difficulty with the current provisions of the Act and the Award. There is

no critical need, there is no current difficulty, the change targets the vulnerable and is proposed in a sector with significant casual employment.

40. The change would significantly increase the pressure available to an employer to press a worker to agree to annual leave.

41. We note the application doesn't identify how this 'flexibility' and cost on employees assists to maintain the viability of any employer. Annual leave is an entitlement for employees which must be maintained if not paid.

42. The structure would permit an employer to press a vulnerable worker, not entitled to Job Keeper, to denude their annual leave accrual while replacing them with workers for whom an employer is funded with Job Keeper.

43. The structure would permit an employer to press any part-time worker, not entitled to Job Keeper, to denude their annual leave accrual while replacing them with cheaper younger workers.

44. Such structures are neither reasonable nor fair. There is no basis for the need, it does nothing to address the viability of business during the pandemic.

45. The Job Keeper structure in place permits an employer to give certain directions in relation to annual leave in circumstances where there has been identifiable decline in revenue, and wages are being funded by the Federal Government. That structure is not fair and should be impermissible but the legislation appears to permit an employer to use those funds to reduce its annual leave liability.

46. The change is not "a regulatory gap" - the employer is not meeting the thresholds for decline or they are not funded for the liability reduction. The true motivations and expectations of employers for the application can only be tested through proper filing and examination of evidence.

Close Down

47. The H.9 provisions would appear to permit an employer to close its business "for reasons attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic." Award covered employers currently can only stand down employees in accordance with the Act. The language of H.9 draws into question whether the application seeks to broaden the circumstances in which an employer may stand down an employee. It is not comparable to the language in [2020] FWCFB 1690.

48. This is relevant as an employer may not compel an employee to be not paid during a close down unless the requirements of s.524 of the Act are met.

49. There is no "regulatory gap". The reward for being stood down under the Job Keeper provisions is a payment of $1500 per fortnight. The proposed structure would permit the denuding of leave or non-payment of wages other than in accordance with the simple provisions of s.524 of the Act.

50. If the close down was a result of "a stoppage of work for any cause for which the employer cannot reasonable be held responsible" then the regulatory arrangement through s.524 deals with the circumstance.

51. RAFFWU is deeply concerned that the applicant and its consenters seek to expand the circumstances in which workers may be not paid contrary to contracts of employment and the workplace rights in existence at this time.

52. We note the scheme devised by the applicant and its consenters targets vulnerable visa workers and the very many other low paid workers who are unlikely to have resources to sustain life should they not be paid. These attacks on the most vulnerable must be rejected and scrutinized through a full and open trial with evidence as to the express need for such extraordinary action.

s.134 Considerations

53. The one and a half page submission on the Modern Award objective of the applicant and its consenters does not split the various schemes they devised for s.134 consideration.

54. We submit there is no balance. The scheme is entirely in the favour of employers, many of whom may very well be experiencing record sales as noted in Annexure A. We note the applicant and its consenters appear to already be entertaining a life for their scheme beyond the three month period (see [31,a].)

55. The Award is relevant and no evidence has been filed which could lead to a different conclusion.

56. Clearly the empoyees covered by the Award are low paid. More than 80% of McDonald's workers are paid some form of junior rate amplifying the detriment of already low wages.

57. The scheme will discourage enterprise bargaining to the extent it is relevant. In essence the scheme is a negotiated position between the applicant and its consenters but lacks any of the explanation, advice, access or opportunity for workers to have their voice heard.

58. The scheme has a centrepiece of destabilizing secure employment (H.7) and pushing workers out of paid employment (H.9). It is ludicrous to suggest workforce participation will increase. It does the opposite by placing greater power in the hands of employers who may suffer no decline at all, let alone on a level requiring intervention. We reiterate no evidence is filed on these issues at all.

59. The scheme will undermine social inclusion.

60. The scheme destabilises part-time employment and casualises the employment relationship. There is nothing productive or efficient about such practices.

61. The scheme is known to undermine additional remuneration by avoiding the casual loading. The scheme will permit the avoidance of remuneration altogether (close downs.)

62. The scheme will reduce employment costs. That is its purpose. However, there is no "essential" basis for the changes. There is no evidence that any of the changes will ensure "ongoing viability" or that for many employers there is a foundational viability risk. There is no evidence on which the Commission can act in favour of the scheme. The failure to bring evidence should count against the applicant and its consenters. Any evidence must be up to date and examinable.

63. The complex proposed structure is a negative consideration.

64. As to the factors in paragraph 134(1)(a) and 134(1)(c), the proposed clause will have a serious and detrimental impact on the needs of the low paid. The low paid are more likely to be highly sensitive to the opportunity to work additional hours to supplement their incomes. They are more likely to make concessions to their employers to secure the opportunity to work additional hours.

65. The low paid are also less likely to be able to secure flexible arrangements, such as short notice childcare, because of the costs associated with these arrangements. If the Award was varied as proposed, the low paid are more likely to see:

(a) greater uncertainty in their working hours; and

(b) a potential reduction in their opportunities to work overtime.

66. As was said in the Casual and Part-time Employment Case, regularity in relation to hours worked is an important feature of part-time employment and in the absence of such regularity reduced hours of work may not be conducive to reconciling work and family responsibilities. The Tribunal recognised then, and cannot sensibly depart from the observation now, that if hours of work are

subject to change at short notice it can create problems for organising child care (and, RAFFWU adds, other carer responsibilities and personal commitments) as these arrangements generally require stable hours and predictable timing.

67. As to paragraph 134(1)(d), the section refers to flexible modern work practices. There is nothing modern about the proposed amendments. To the contrary, they are subversive amendments that seek to reverse the gains secured by part-time employees. The proposed changes seek to secure cost-saving benefits to employers, at the expense of an important protection for part-time employees (being the requirement that changes are recorded in writing). This elevates the profit motive of employers at the expense of certainty, security and stability for part-time workers and their families. The impact is particularly acute for low paid part-time workers, who form a substantial part of the relevant class.

68. We reiterate from the last full and proper analysis of evidence pertaining to the scheme proposed (part-time employment) the decision of the Full Bench at [148] in [2019] FWCFB 272:

> *In our view the proposed variation **lacks merit**. If the award was varied in the manner proposed by Ai Group **it would not provide 'a fair and relevant minimum safety net of terms and conditions'; it would not achieve the modern awards objective.** In reaching this conclusion we have taken into account the s 134 considerations, insofar as they are relevant to the claim. We reject the claim for those reasons.*

69. The scheme proposed by the applicant and its consenters does not meet the Modern Award objective and must not be implemented.

Retail and Fast Food Workers Union

5 May 2020

ANNEXURE A

From: James Farrell [redacted]
Sent: Monday, 4 May 2020 3:25 PM
To: Josh Cullinan <jcullinan@raffwu.org.au>
Subject: Re: Fast Food Industry Award - Attack by Bosses on Minimum Rights

Dear Mr Cullinan,

Thankyou for your detailed reply to my previous email - I really appreciate receiving detailed help for my petty work issues during this covid crisis.

I would also like to comment on the proposed changes to the fast food award. I have worked at Mcdonalds for 6 years now, mainly during the evening and late at night. I have been working minimum hours since COVID began. I am unable to pick up more shifts like I used to, because school children are now employed to work during the day and very late at night. This is happening to many other non-school workers at my workplace.

We are told that less people are going to Mcdonald's stores, especially late at night for my store. However, food delivery sales are still strong. My store also broke a store lunch sales record a week ago. Friends of mine at Franchisees' stores still seem to be well off as they have access to JobKeeper, whereas I do not. I would expect many other Franchisees stores, to also be receiving JobKeeper quite easily.

Mcdonald's can very easily pay it's workers the bare minimum. Our 10 minute breaks RAFFWU won last year are no longer to be clocked on during shifts at any Mcdonalds' stores. Workers are heavily frowned upon to take them; it's the culture at every Mcdonalds I have worked at. And sure enough, 10 minute breaks are pretty much non-existant at my store again.

My Mcdonald's only has around 4-5 full time employees out of 150 crew - these are a few managers, the boss, and 1 maintenance worker. There is already no burden on them to pay its workers living wages.

I, like many other 18+ workers, need my guaranteed part-time hours to continue finishing my uni degree and to continue living independently. Without set shifts, I will only be rostered late night maintenance shifts or 3 hour late-night shifts. In the past, I have had lots of long stretches of time where I am only rostered 3-4 hour shifts between the hours of 9pm-3am. I have never consistently received an amount of rostered shifts that I can live satisfactoriraly on. I have always had to rely upon always saying yes to filling the sick calls + 'no show' shifts of other workers.
My part time contract, won by RAFFWU, should be the bare minimum for fast food work.

Mcdonalds likes to claim that it's a very 'flexible' work environment for people working while at school or university. This promise should be able to kept for it's very few part-time employees. Mcdonalds has consistently demonstrated, for a long time, that it will do everything in its power to 'shake off' the few hard-working, over 18, part-time employees.

Mcdonald's continues to demonstrate how little it is doing during this COVID crisis. All stores continue to not supply hand sanitiser to workers or customers. I still have to accept cash

payments. The quality of our gloves is very cheap and easily gets holes. Customer's are not made to stand 1.5m from the counter. When there is a lack of crew supervisors + managers on, it is quite noticeable at any Mcdonalds, that the kiosks, bathrooms and doors will not be cleaned and sanitised regularly. It is imperative that if Mcdonalds is allowed to remain open, it should be made to roster enough staff in order to follow Mcdonald's as well as COVID procedures. McOpco still does not hire private security despite the prevalent sexual harrassment and aggressive behaviour from its high volume of customers - especially at its 24 hour stores.

Mcdonalds is surely one of the least affected businesses in the current pandemic situation. The corporation should be focusing on improving and fixing the few McOpco stores it is still responsible for, its cheap & exploited pool of young workers, the safety (and health) of its customers for its deceivingly-cheap food, helping the local communities & small businesses nearby that it sucks the money out of, or our devastated Australian environment in 2020 that it continues to actively destroy.

But it is also a joke to think that SDA it is legally allowed to be called a union and accept money from workers like me.

Thanks again RAFFWU.

In solidarity,
James